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THE MYTH OF THE DISPOSABLE OPINION:
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS AND
GOVERNMENT LITIGANTS IN THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALSt
Lauren K. Robel*
Since 1976, every federal appellate court has adopted rules that
limit the publication of opinions. 1 As a result, only a minority of the
federal courts of appeals publish even half of their decisions on the
merits. 2 Although withholding opinions from publication is meant to
reduce or eliminate their applicability to litigation, the large body of
unpublished decisions creates a variety of incentives for those litigants
who have unusual access to these opinions to use them. The policies
reflected by the publication plans do not anticipate these sorts of incentives. Although the rules adopted by the courts of appeals attempt
to curtail litigant use of unpublished opinions, the controls do not
work because these mechanisms restrict only certain uses - usually of
the most overt kind - such as citation. Not only do the appellate
rules fail to destroy the usefulness of unpublished opinions, they also
exacerbate the advantages that the selective publication plans give frequent litigants.
This article discusses the courts' adoption of the limited publication plans and analyzes the methods used by the courts to discourage
the use of unpublished opinions. It also discusses the results of a survey conducted to determine if, and how, government litigants - some
t © 1989 by Lauren K. Robel.
• Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University- Bloomington. B.A. 1978, Auburn University; J.D. 1983, Indiana University. - Ed. The author is grateful to Terry Bethel, Thomas
Davies, Joseph Hoffman, John Oakley, Richard Posner, and Jeff Stake for helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this article, and to Marcella DePeters for research assistance. I am especially
grateful to Donna Stienstra for help with advice, information, and wisdom at all stages of this
project. I would like to thank the Indiana University School of Law for research support.
1. See D.C. CIR. R. 14; lsr CIR. R. 36.1-36.2; 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERAT·
ING PROCEDURES [hereinafter IOP) 5(F); 4TH CIR. IOP 36.3-36.4; 5TH CIR. R. 47.5; 6TH CIR.
R. 24; 7TH CIR. R. 53; Bra CIR. IOP Vl(B) & appx.; 9TH CIR. R. 21; lOTH CIR. R. 36; l lTH
CIR. IOP 36; FED. CIR. R. 18.
2. D. STJENSTRA, UNPUBLISHED DISPOSmONS: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE
CoURTS OF APPEALS 40 (Table 2) (1985). As of 1984, only four circuits published a majority of
their opinions. The Third Circuit published a mere 22.9% of its opinions that year. Even more
dramatic differences within circuits are possible when one looks at publication rates within subject-matter areas. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
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of the chief unanticipated beneficiaries of the publication plans make use of unpublished opinions. Finally, it challenges the assumption that limited publication is essential in an age of caseload crisis.
THE SELECTIVE PUBLICATION PLANS

There are differences among the publication plans adopted by the
circuits, but the assumptions underlying the plans are fairly uniform. 3
The central assumption is that not all decisions by the courts of appeals warrant publication.4 This assumption is based on the view that
appellate opinions serve two primary functions: first, to resolve particular disputes between litigants; second, to advance the state of the law
in some manner. 5 All of the publication plans are based on the central
assumption that opinions that serve no lawmaking function should not
be published. 6 Clearly, however, appellate opinions serve a host of
other purposes: to supervise the lower courts, for instance, or to provide a mechanism for interested or disll!.terested observers to keep
3. The central difference is in the amount of direction the plans provide the judges in making
publication decisions. Some of the publication plans are quite detailed. See 4TH CIR. IOP 36.3
(Opinions will be published only "if the author or a majority of the joining judges believe the
opinion satisfies one or more of the standards for publication. These standards are: i. It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law within this Circuit; or ii. It involves a
legal issue of continuing public interest; or iii. It criticizes existing law; or iv. It contains a[]
historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative; or v. It resolves a conflict between panels
of this Court, or creates a conflict with a decision in another circuit."); 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(l) ("A
published opinion will be filed when the decision (i) establishes a new, or changes an existing rule
of law; (ii) involves an issue of continuing public interest; (iii) criticizes or questions law; (iv)
constitutes a significant and nonduplicative contribution to the legal literature (a) by a historical
review oflaw, (b) by describing legislative history, or (c) by resolving or creating a conflict in the
law; (v) reverses a judgment or denies enforcement of an order when the lower court or agency
has published an opinion supporting the judgment or order; or (vi) is pursuant to an order of
remand from the Supreme Court and is not rendered merely in ministerial obedience to specific
directions of that Court."). Other plans are less comprehensive. See Jo CIR. IOP (5)(F) ("The
criterion normally applied [to determine publication of signed opinions] is whether or not the
opinion has precedential or institutional value."). All of the plans state, in one form or another,
that opinions which establish new rules or law should be published.
4. This assumption underlies even those limited publication plans that have a presumption in
favor of publication. See, e.g., lST CIR. R. 36.2(a) ("In general, the court thinks it desirable that
opinions be published. . . . This policy may be overcome in some situations where an opinion
does not articulate a new rule of law, modify an established rule, apply an established rule to
novel facts, or serve otherwise as a significant guide to future litigants.").
5. Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation ofLimited Publication in the United States Courts of
Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 579 (1981) [hereinafter Reynolds &
Richman I]; Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent - Limited Publication and
No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1182 (1978)
[hereinafter Reynolds & Richman II]; Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 810 (1961); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APP. JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 2-3 (1973) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APP. JUSTICE]. For a comprehensive discussion of arguments for and against limited publication, see
Reynolds & Richman II, supra.
6. Most of the publication plans also allow publication when the case is particularly newsworthy. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 14(b)(7).
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track of how an agency is administering a statute. For the most part,
however, the policies that inform the publication plans do not consider
the plans' impact on these purposes. 7
Selective publication plans are also premised on the assumption
that publication is costly in a number of ways. 8 The judges suffer the
costs involved in preparing an opinion for publication. 9 Presumably,
the plans will not eliminate the costs of researching the issues to be
decided and formulating a rationale for a decision, since these must be
done regardless of publication. Rather, the plans are meant to minimize additional special production costs associated with publication:
those that arise because judges do not simply decide a case but also like. other published authors - attempt to express that resolution felicitously, to shore it up with citations to authority at every tum, and
to anticipate in writing possible criticisms of the opinion. 10 If judges
did not publish, then the range of costs associated with felicitous and
authoritative expression would be eliminated. Litigants suffer the
costs of delays that occur while judges attempt to write. 11 Everyone
suffers from added costs associated with increasingly large volumes of
the Federal Reporter: research becomes more inefficient and time-consuming as the number of published opinions increases, as does maintaining the libraries and citechecking against the possibilities of missed
authority. 12
The argument for nonpublication, then, depends upon the claim
that judges (with their staffs) 13 can efficiently identify cases that add
7. See infra text accompanying notes 18-32.
8. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 124-26 (1985); Reynolds & Richman I, supra
note 5, at 580.
9. By some accounts, opinion writing is the most time-consuming part of a judge's job. U.S.
COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FED. APP. Cr. SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 49 (1975) [hereinafter COMMISSION] (results of Third Circuit
Time Study revealed that in 1971-72 judges spent almost half of their time writing opinions);
ADVISORY CoUNCIL ON APP. JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 1 (state court judges reported that opinion writing took more of their time than any of their other tasks).
10. The always provocative Judge Posner argues that while the desire for felicitous prose
should be encouraged, the tendency toward excessive citation is a disease (of which law clerks are
the carriers) that should be eradicated. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 108-09.
11. Interestingly, one study of limited publication plans indicated that, while cases decided
through unpublished disposition are typically decided more quickly than those that are not, there
is no empirical support for the hypothesis that limited publication enhances overall productivity.
Reynolds & Richman I, supra note 5, at 594-97. Daniel Hoffman has also been unable to conclude that limited publication really saves time for judges. Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal
Appellate Court Opinions, 6 Jusr. SYS. J. 405, 419-20 (1981).
12. Some of the limited publication rules make specific mention of these costs. See, e.g., lsr
CIR. R. 36.1 (limited publication adopted "in the interests both of expedition in the particular
case, and of saving time and effort in research on the part of future litigants").
13. See R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 24; J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS (1987) (describing staff
function in screening cases for expedited treatment); cf Davies, Gresham's Law Revisited: Expe-
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significantly to the costs of litigation and decision but add nothing to
the law. Supposedly, once these cases are identified, withholding them
from publication reduces costs associated with them.
The option most responsive to the concerns underlying the publication plans would be to eliminate opinions altogether. 14 By doing
this, the courts would achieve every cost saving that was hypothesized
in connection with nonpublication, but would avoid entirely the risk of
creating a twilight zone of written-but-unpublished work. This option, however, has proven unattractive to litigants and judges alike: 15
summary decision serves none of the legitimating functions of appeal
and may leave parties with the feeling that the court never considered
their arguments. 16 Instead, the publication plans adopted by the
courts are a compromise: they eliminate only publication of the decision, rather than the actual writing of the.opinion. The resulting "unpublished opinions" are sometimes extremely obtuse, and they are
often short, but just as often they resemble in every w~y the published
opinions of the courts: facts are stated, the parties' legal arguments
are addressed, and authority is cited and explained. 17 The result of
this tension between the need to explain and legitimate results to the
parties and the premises of the selective publication plans has been
that unpublished opinions are still opinions - providing insights into
dited Processing Techniques and the A/location of Appellate Resources, 6 Jusr. SYS. J. 372, 375
(1981) (discussing suggested reforms directed toward expedited processing of civil claims, in order to dismiss frivolous claims quickly).
14. This could be done by summarily affirming or reversing the decision below. See, e.g.,
5TH CIR. R. 47.6 ("Affirmance Without Opinion").
15. The Fifth Circuit attempted for a time to eliminate opinions altogether in a substantial
number of cases. See Shuchman & Gelfand, The Use ofLocal Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can
Judges Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980). Several other circuits also have rules which would allow summary disposition without opinion. Reynolds &
Richman II, supra note 5, at 1174-75 & n.37. Reynolds and Richman note that summary disposition without opinion has been almost universally condemned. Id. at 1174. See also COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 49 (attorneys opposed to doing away with opinions in any number of
cases).
16. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 10 (1976)
("The obligation to give reasons is vital to [the functions of appellate review] •... An unreasoned
decision has very little claim to acceptance by the defeated party, and is difficult or impossible to
accept as an act reflecting systematic application of legal principles.").
17. There is considerable stylistic variation in unpublished opinions even within circuits. In
the Ninth Circuit, for example, it is not at all unusual to see lengthy unpublished opinions even
in social security disability cases, in which the record is conscientiously and painstakingly reviewed, and the applicable regulations discussed and applied. See; e.g., Rose v. Heckler, No. 844246 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 1986) (affirming denial of benefits after three-page discussion of facts and
three-page discussion of standard of review, relevant regulations, and how regulations properly
applied). On the other hand, even unpublished reversals in the Ninth Circuit can be relatively
brief. See, e.g., Allsopp v. Schweiker, No. 84-6536 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1986) (two-page opinion
reversing denial of disability benefits and discussing several errors in Social Security Appeals
Council's consideration of evidence and procedures).
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a court's reasoning and suggesting to advocates the arguments that
could win or lose a case.
DISINCENTIVES FOR USE

Lawyers are trained to use opinions: to make arguments based on
them, to try to distinguish them, and to consider how they bear on the
outcome of their cases. In order to preserve the savings associated
with nonpublication, though, lawyers must be persuaded not to use
unpublished opinions. The primary disincentive to using unpublished
opinions was to be the opinions' inherent worthlessness as precedent.
If these opinions really did nothing to add to what was already available in the Federal Reporter, the courts reasoned, then lawyers would
soon realize it, and would not attempt to use them. 18 In addition to
explicitly disavowing their precedential value, 19 courts employ two
mechanisms to discourage the use of unpublished opinions.
First, all but four of the circuits circumscribe, by rule or by practice, the distribution of unpublished opinions. 20 In most circuits, the
opinions are routinely distributed to parties to the case and the lower
court judge whose decision was reviewed. 21 In six circuits, the opinions are also circulated to all appellate judges on the court. 22 By limiting access to the opinions to the parties involved, the courts limit the
number of attorneys who can use the opinions. Even though theoretically the opinions are available to anyone who wants to dig through
the court archives to retrieve them, practically speaking they are un".'
available because they are neither indexed nor filed in a manner that
would facilitate retrieval. 23 By limiting distribution of the opinions,
then, the courts make it unlikely that many litigants will find them
useful (or find them at all).
0

18. COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 52.
19. Most of the circuits disavow the precedential value of unpublished opinions through forbidding their citation as authority before the court. See infra text accompanying note 24.
20. D. STIENSTRA, supra note 2, at 15-22. Stienstra discovered that practices vary from
circuit to circuit. Three circuits {the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth) allow subscriptions to unpublished opinions despite the fact that the rules in these circuits appear to limit distribution of the
opinions. Id. at 19.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 20.
23. The Tenth Circuit indexed the opinions for a while but has ceased this practice. Id. at
19-20 n.39; most courts simply file them chronologically in the clerk's office and list the outcomes
of the cases on tables in the Federal Reporter. However, only three of the circuits that list the
results in this manner include all unpublished decisions in the list sent to West Publishing Com·
pany for inclusion in the Reporter. Id. at 21. With the growth oflegal databases such as West/aw
and Lexis, unpublished opinions may become more accessible. Both of these services have begun
to include many unpublished opinions from federal appellate courts. However, the availability of
unpublished dispositions through these databases is not uniform across the circuits.
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Second, all but the Third and the D.C. Circuits limit citation of the
opinions to the court. 24 Eight of the circuits forbid citation except in
related cases or to support a claim of res judicata. Four of the circuits
allow citation when there is no better precedent available. 25
By forbidding citation, the courts hope to conserve the presumed
savings of nonpublication. First, if cases could be cited and ther.efore
would be used by a wide audience seeking authority, judges might feel
compelled to do a better job writing them, and so the assumed savings
in judicial time would be lost. 26 Second, savings in consumption costs
·would be lost because litigants would feel the need to research these
opinions, if they could be cited, and publishers would publish them. 27
Finally, because the courts' distribution rules assure that access to
these opinions will not be uniform, the no-citation rules supposedly
insure that those litigants who have unusually large access to unpublished opinions will have no incentive to make use of that access in
unfair ways. 28
To achieve the presumed savings of selective publication, then, the
courts had to assure in some way that their unpublished opinions were
truly disposable. The mechanisms they chose, however - reduced access and no-citation - are among the most controversial aspects of
selective publication plans. Before the plans were actually implemented, the Commission on Revision of the Federal Appellate System
(chaired by Senator Roman Hruska) held hearings to allow the legal
community the opportunity to comment on the proposals. 29 While
testimony before the Hruska Commission generally supported the
view that not all cases warranted published opinions, some witnesses
24. lST CIR. R. 36.2(6); 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 4TH CIR. IOP 36.5; 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3; 6TH CIR.
R. 24(b); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 8TH CIR. R. 8(i); 9TH CIR. R. 36.3; lOTH CIR. R. 36.3. The
Eleventh Circuit has no formal rule, but in practice limits citation. D. STIENSTRA, supra note 2,
at 22-23. Interestingly, the prohibition on citation of opinions extends only to citation within the
circuit. Because citation rule$ are promulgated by each circuit independently, there is no prohibition on citing an unpublished case to a court in another circuit, and some attorneys who responded to the survey stated that they had done so. See infra text 11ccompanying notes 78-84.
25. For a complete sunimary of the rules and practices of the circuits on citation, see D.
STIENSTRA, supra note 2, at 51-52. She reports, based on interviews with court staff, that
prohibitions on citation of unpublished materials have been effective in preventing attorneys from
including the materials in briefs, although she notes that the courts have no way of determining
whether the opinions are being used without citation. Id. at 24.
26. See supra text accompanying note 10.
27. See 1 Hearings Before the Commn. on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
Second Phase, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1974) [hereinafter 1 Hearings] (letter of Dwight Opperman, President, West Publishing Co.).
28. See, e.g., 2 Hearings Before the Commn. on Revision of the Federal Coun Appellate System, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1072 (1975) [hereinafter 2 Hearings] (testimony of Robert Stern); 1
Hearings, supra note 27, at 556 (testimony of Willard Lassers).
29. See 1 Hearings, supra note 27; 2 Hearings, supra note 28; COMMISSION, supra note 9.
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expressed concern about the proposed ban on citation. 30
Most of the concern over the no-citation rules centered on the issue
of access to the opinions. Witnesses worried that litigants who appeared frequently before the courts would be able to use the opinions
despite the ban on citation, because as parties they had unusual access
to the opinions. 31 Witnesses also worried that judges would consult
the opinions in an effort to avoid intracircuit conflicts and to keep
abreast of the work of their courts, and would in doing so rely on
opinions not generally available to attorneys appearing before these
judges.32
Thus, the concern arose early on that the publication plans would
result in a secret body of applicable and pertinent law available only to
certain advantaged litigants and the courts before which they routinely
appeared. Further examination bears out the legitimacy of this
concern.
THE

MYTH OF THE DISPOSABLE OPINION
AND THE PROBLEMS OF ACCESS

The control mechanisms described above were designed to create
disposable opinions - opinions that would disappear from the landscape, leaving no precedential trace behind. If the assumption that a
disposable opinion can be created is wrong, or at least wrong very
often, then, I argue, the selective publication plans, at least in their
present form, cannot be supported as a fair or just way to manage the
workload of the courts. Differential access to the opinions favors certain litigants. Moreover, such differential access, with its attendant
favoritism, would occur under almost any selective publication plan
that also achieved the cost savings sought by the courts.
In this section, I examine critically the assumptions underlying
publication and the mechanisms the courts employ to discourage use
of these opinions. 33 I then discuss the results of a survey of govern30. See, e.g., 1 Hearings, supra note 27, at 557 (testimony of Willard Lassers).
31. Cf 1 Hearings, supra note 27, at 452 (statement of the Bar Association of the Seventh
Federal Circuit) ("If [unpublished opinions] can be cited, they become a source of secret law
available to regular litigants before the court but not to the remainder of the bar, thereby giving
unfair advantage to such regular litigants as the U.S. Attorney.").
32. Judge Sprecher noted this possibility in testimony before the Hruska Commission, 1
Hearings, supra note 27, at 536 (court might have to resort to "some kind of an intracourt index
of unpublished opinions ... available for the court, even though they cannot be cited by the court
or to the court"). In fact, many of the circuits do circulate all these opinions to judges within the
circuit. D. STIENSTRA, supra note 2, at 18. Court staff attorneys often use the opinions as well,
creating banks of opinions for future reference.
33. My discussion is based on research conducted in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. Robel, Unpublished Opinions in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (1988)
(unpublished report to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on file with
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ment attorneys who regularly litigate cases before the federal appeals
courts, to discover whether the practices of these attorneys pertaining
to unpublished opinions bear out the assumptions supporting the
courts' publication plans.
The selective publication plans fail in their effort to create a class of
disposable opinions, largely because these plans depend on mistaken
assumptions. The mistaken assumptions are of three kinds. First, the
central assumption, that only lawmaking and not dispute-resolving
opinions give litigants useful information, is wrong because it underestimates the varieties of information that lawyers retrieve from opinions. Even if the courts select for publication only those opinions that
"make law," unpublished opinions contain useful information because
opinions tell lawyers more than simply "what the law is." Second, the
publication plans assume a narrow, rules-oriented concept of precedent, so that if the plans work as expected, they will systematically
leave unpublished much of what lawyers would routinely use in their
work. Third, the plans do not operate neutrally with regard to the
subject matter of the opinions, so that most of the work of the courts
in several subject areas appears only in unpublished form. Even were
it true, then, that the courts had succeeded in some general sense in
separating the routine from the important cases, attorneys who work
in these areas cannot develop a sense of what the courts consider "routine," or how the courts apply the "important" cases without looking
at the courts' unpublished work.
What kinds of information could litigants get from unpublished
opinions that are not foreseen by the publication plans? One important piece of information is the shape of the universe of decisions by a
court in a particular area of law. The information might be as simple
as knowing the odds. 34 For instance, an attorney in California in 1987
might assess differently an appeal of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) if he knew that the Ninth Circuit published
only 27% of its immigration opinions in that year, and that over half
of the reversals of BIA decisions occurred in unpublished decisions. 35
author). This report was prepared for use by the court in assessing its limited publication plan.
The author studied all opinions from that court, published and unpub~hed,-during the period
from October, 1986 through September, 1987.
--34. One might argue that at least in those circuits which publish results of appeals in tables
in the Federal Reporter, an attorney could in fact know the "odds." This is hardly possible,
though, without an understanding of the subject matter of the litigation and the result in the
district court.
35. Robel, supra note 33, at 19. Rates of publication in immigration may have been even
lower in earlier years. Statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts reveal that the court published only 14% of the cases in which the INS was a party in
1983, and only 10% in 1984. Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases, 1970·1984: lnte-
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Similarly, an attorney considering an appeal of an agency denial of
disability benefits might evaluate an appeal differently if she knew that
the same court published only 25% of its disability review cases, and
only seven of twenty-three reversals. 36
The attorney with the immigration case might also benefit from
being able to discern trends in the court's review of immigration decisions. Ifhe looked in the Federal Reporter for opinions in 1987 having
to do with immigration, he would find twenty-two. But the court decided eighty-eight immigration cases on the merits that year. 37
If the court's behavior in its unpublished decisions simply mirrors
what it announces in its published decisions, one might conclude that
the publication plans are working well: the attorney has been saved
from looking at sixty-six cases. However, as I hope I can demonstrate,
it is likely that there will be a disparity between the two, even assuming that judges never consciously misuse publication plans.38 For example, the published immigration opinions of the Ninth Circuit for
the eleven months beginning October 1, 1986, included one concurrence39 and one dissent. 40 By contrast, there were seven concurrences
and seven dissents in the unpublished opinions.41 For the most part,
grated Database (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Appellate Terminations Database #8429) [hereinafter Database] (information about how figures were
retrieved from database on file with author).
36. Robel, supra note 33, at 21. Of the unpublished reversals, all but one involved the appellate court's determination that benefits had been erroneously denied.
37. Id.
38. There is a good possibility that judges do sometimes use the publication plans for reasons
not contemplated by the rules. I have found examples, for instance, of "private" reprimands to
district court-judges and Assistant United States Attorneys. Consider the history of Kling v.
County ofLos Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kling I). Kling sued th~ City, alleging that
she had been denied admission to nursing school because of a disability, in violation of federal
law. After a hearing, the district court denied a preliminary injunction. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded with instructions to enter the injunction. 633 F.2d at 876. After a trial,
the same district court judge found that Kling was not handicapped within the meaning of federal law and that she had not suffered discrimination. On June 13, 1985, the Ninth Circuit
reversed again in an unpublished opinion. No. 83-6193 (9th Cir. June 13, 1985). The court
noted that the trial had not produced substantially different evidence from that considered in
Kling], that the district judge's conclusions were inconsistent and clearly erroneous, and that the
judge's findings were directly contrary to the appeals court's decision in the first appeal. The
court ordered the case remanded, to a different judge, for entry of damages. No. 83-6193. On
July 16, 1985, the court amended its earlier opinion to take out language about the trial judge
and (after certiorari was granted in the case) ordered the opinion published. Kling v. County of
Los Angeles, 169 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kling II). Finally, the Supreme Court summarily
reversed the Ninth Circuit. County ofLos Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936 (1985). In a dissent to
the summary reversal, Justice Stevens argues that the use of unpublished opinions and summary
reversals encourages "decisionmaking without the discipline and accountability that the preparation of opinions requires." 474 U.S. at 940.
39. Mada-Luna v. INS, 813 F.2d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., concurring).
40. Shoo Hwan Kim v. Meese, 810 F.2d 1494, 1498 (9th Cir. 1987) (Norris, J., dissenting).
41. See Robel, supra note 33, at 19-20. Twelve different members of the court wrote separately in unpublished opinions during this period. During previous periods, the rates may have
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the separate opinions criticize the agency for failing to differentiate
properly among review standards or object to other continuing
problems with the agency's implementation of the statute.42 Some of
the opinions, on the other hand, criticize the court for requiring unduly detailed findings from the agency. 43 Taken together, the large
number of reversals and separate expressions in unpublished opinions
reveals a good bit of dissatisfaction on the part of the court with a
variety of agency practices, as well as a fair amount of disagreement
among members of the court about what it ought to require of the
agency. It would be difficult to discern this pattern, however, if one
were limited to the court's published expressions.44
What accounts for the different picture of the work of the court
one gets when one compares the unpublished and published opinions?
There are at least two explanations. The first concerns the concept of
precedent used to establish which cases should be decided through
published opinions and which through unpublished opinions. The second concerns the wide variations in publication rates depending on the
subject matter of the appeal.
First, and obviously, the rules are designed to reflect a substantive
difference between what is published and what is not. One would expect the unpublished opinions to differ from the published ones because they have been systematically sorted by the limited publication
rules into different "stacks." The plans intend to sort out only routine
applications of rules. In theory, one ought to be able to predict, on the
basis of the published "lawmaking" opinions, the outcome of the unpublished opinions with a high degree of accuracy. (This is not to
suggest that unpublished opinions are meant to be simply a vehicle for
disposing of frivolous appeals. 45) The limited publication plans intend
that unpublished opinions ~e to be used for applications of pre-exbeen higher. Data for 1983 show thirty-nine concurrences in unpublished immigration opinions,
and 1984 shows an astonishing eighty-four concurrences. Database, supra note 35.
42. Robel, supra note 33, at 20.
43. Id.
44. One of the respondents in the survey, discussed infra at notes 78-84 and accompanying
text, candidly stated that one of the uses he makes of unpublished opinions is to monitor court
trends and to gather intelligence about the judges.
45. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 122 ("These are not frivolous appeals."). My study of the
Ninth Circuit's unpublished work confirrils Posner's point. There were very few unpublished
cases in which Rule 11 sanctions were imposed, with the exception of the cases involving tax
protesters. Even using the term "frivolous appeal" in a less technical sense, I do not believe that
most of the cases decided through unpublished opinions raise no or few issues worthy of consideration, or even that their outcome is necessarily foreordained. Cf. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of
Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a Califof7!ia Cqurt of Appeal, 1982 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 543, 582 (arguing that the concept of a "frivolous appeal" is unhelpful in explaining high criminal appeal affirmance rate). ·
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isting rules, rather than for formulation and articulation of the new
rules. Granted, the plans hope to distinguish between routine and
novel applications. 46 But if the plans worked perfectly, the universe of
published opinions would resemble a treatise without footnotes: It
would be limited to opinions that create rules, 47 opinions that contain
significant scholarship (historical treatments of legal rules, or previously unreported legislative history), 48 or opinions that are "newsworthy."49 This world might be a judge's dream come true, so but I
suspect it would be a practitioner's nightmare: While it might open up
the possibility for endlessly creative arguments, it would seriously impede a lawyer's ability to make rational decisions about what to argue
and how to argue it. Lawyers need to know how stable published
precedents are, how they apply in different fact situations, and
whether there are unanticipated problems with the precedent in application. In short, they need to know what courts do with their "lawmaking" opinions. This information is sometimes available in
unpublished form, and if the plans worked perfectly, that is the only
place it would be available.
Luckily for lawyers, for the most part the plans do not work perfectly, with one rather large exception, which I will discuss. But they
sometimes do, and the results can be illustrated with an example,
again from the Ninth Circuit, involving the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RIC0). 51 A relatively recent statute,
RICO contains provisions for civil liability that have proven enormously attractive to plaintiffs Qargely due to a treble damages provision) and enormously difficult for courts. 52 Many of the most difficult
46. See, e.g. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 (publication appropriate when opinion "applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those in previous published opinions applying the rule").
47. All of the publication plans require publication when an opinion "establishes ••• a rule of
law within [the] Circuit." 4TH CIR. IOP 36.3.
48. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 53 (opinion published if it "constitutes a significant and non-duplicative [sic] contribution to legal literature (a) by a historical review of law, (b) by describing
legislative history, or (c) by resolving or creating a conflict in the law").
49. This is the only category routinely included in the publication plans that, presumably,
has nothing to do with assessment of precedential value. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 53 (publication
when opinion "involves an issue of continuing public interest").
50. There may be, however, some reason to doubt this. Judge Posner has recently written
that "[d]espite the vast number of published opinions, most federal circuit judges will confess
that a surprising fraction of federal appeals are difficult to decide, not because there are too many
precedents but because there are too few on point." Posner, supra note 8, at 123.
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
52. Judge Bums, a district court judge sitting by designation on one of the panels that decided a RICO appeal during the period studied, noted, "RICO is for me (and many, if not most,
of my district court colleagues) an agonizingly difficult and confusing area of the law." Sun
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 196 (9th Cir. 1987) (Bums, J., concurring).
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questions have revolved around applying the statute: For example,
when are ordinary businesses deemed RICO "enterprises"? In a recent one-year period, s3 the Ninth Circuit decided thirteen appeals involving civil RICO: eight opinions were published, and five (including
one reversal)' were left unpublished. s4 It would be fair to say that these
unpublished opinions were not groundbreaking. Most of them, in fact,
discuss pleading requirements. In Chang v. California Canadian
Bank, ss the plaintiffs had alleged that several banks were involved in
an elaborate "Ponzi" schemes 6 involving automobile resales. The appeal challenged the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a
claim. The complaint had premised the RICO claim on alleged mail
and wire fraud violations. The eleven-page opinion contains a detailed
discussion of the requirements of pleading participation in a.RICO
enterprise. While this case could easily be characterized as routine,
the citations in the opinion on this issue were to district court opinions
or opinions from other circuits, rather than opinions of the appeals
court, indicating that local circuit authority on the issues in the opinion waJ sparse.
Similarly, Ormes v. LA. Fialkojf Administrators, Inc. s7 discusses
pleading requirements. Ormes, a corporation, alleged that its provider
of medical insurance had misrepresented the provisions of the policy
and then refused to pay claims filed by Ormes' employees. The complaint is typical of many filed under RICO for business misrepresentations. Ormes' complaint did not specify the relationship between the
"person" engaging in the predicate criminal acts and the RICO "enterprise," nor did it allege a "pattern of racketeering activity." While
the court had recently discussed these requirements in published opin53. The period of the Ninth Circuit study, Robel, Supra note 33.
54. Id. at 16. Most of the published RICO opinions during this period were not particularly
noteworthy. They include two per curiam decisions, Sigmond v. Brown, 828 F.2d 8 (9th Cir.
1987) and Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1987) (a sanctions case more
than a RICO case), and an opinion that announced a new rule on statutes of limitations in RICO
cases, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 828 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1987). Two published
opinions might be characterized as RICO opinions, although RICO was not the focus of the
discussion. See Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing securities fraud statute oflimitations) and California Architectural Bldg. Prods. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1987) (short discussion of RICO "pattern" requirement). Three of
the published opinions during this period contain substantial discussions of RICO, Wilcox v.
First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying recent Supreme Court case);
Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1987) (substantial
discussion of pleading requirements); Sun Savings & Loan Assn. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th
Cir. 1987) (applying recent Supreme Court case).
55. No. 86-6529 (9th Cir. July 17, 1987) (WESTLAW).
56. For a description of a "Ponzi" scheme and the history of the scheme's namesake, see
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1923).
57. No. 83-5709 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 1987) (WESTLAW).
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ions, 58 their application to pleading remains confusing to practitioners
and judges alike, 5 9 and publication of opinions like Ormes could be
important to illustrating how the pleading requirements operate.
Finally, in Wavelength, Inc. v. Edwards, 60 the court reversed a dismissal of plaintiff Wavelength's RICO, antitrust, and securities claims.
The eighteen-page opinion contains a lengthy discussion of the complicated facts underlying the complaint and an explanation of why the
facts pleaded were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss the
RICO claim. Such discussions are invaluable in a relatively uncharted
area like this one. 61
Although the unpublished RICO cases discussed above contain information useful to practitioners, they do a fairly good job of achieving
one of the efficiencies sought by the publication plans: the unpublished cases apply rules from published decisions. As I noted earlier,
however, the publication plans ordinarily do not work this efficiently
to weed out applications of rules. The major exception is in subjectmatter areas where unpublished opinions predominate, 62 and the reason that the plans work efficiently here is, I suspect, that these are
areas where judges believe almost all applications are routine. 63
Which areas are these? They include much litigation in which the
58. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1987)
(discussing pleading requirements).
59. See, e.g., Judge Burns' comments, supra note 52.
60. No. 85-6468 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 1986) (WESTLAW).
61. It could be argued that the Ninth Circuit's rule on publication would be expected to
provide for the publication of opinions like these, since they could be deemed to "clarify" rules of
law. 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(a). The RICO examples illustrate, however, a shortcoming in the criteria
for publication: the distinctions among rule development, rule clarification, and rule application
are too fine for routine use. So, some cases that clarify rules will be relegated to unpublished
opinions on the assumption that they merely call for application.
62. If publication rules operated neutrally (i.e., without regard to the subject matter of cases),
then one would expect that the rate of publication would remain constant across all categories of
cases. It does not. In the Ninth Circuit during the period of the study, supra note 33, the court
published an average of 37% of its opinions. But the rates within subject areas varied widely.
The court published 70% of the cases involving securities law during this period, for instance,
but only 10% of the civil rights cases filed by prisoners. Ignoring higher than average rates of
publication, I assumed that lower than average rates of publication were not the result of random
fluctuation for the year examined in the study. This assumption was confirmed by examining
rates of publication across subject areas for different years. (The data for comparison, compiled
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, are available through the Institute for
Social Research at the University of Michigan.) Because the rates remain fairly constant from
year to year, I assumed that the higher than average rates were the result of more systematic
factors.
63. The exception to this is diversity cases. During the study period, the Ninth Circuit published only 38% of its diversity opinions. That 23% of those cases were reversals suggests that
there are difficult issues involved in unpublished diversity opinions. Because federal interpreta·
tions of state law rules are by nature provisionally authoritative and because judges realize that
their opportunity to interpret that law rests on the chance of diversity jurisdiction, judges may
well suppose that the need to publish these opinions is not great.
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government is a party, such as review of agency determinations in immigration and social security cases, Federal Tort Claims Act cases,
criminal and habeas appeals, civil rights actions, and employment discrimination complaints against the federal government. 64 On average,
these are low-status, low-resources types of appeals, and they are the
kinds of cases judges find tedious, 65 with the result that they are often
- perhaps usually - relegated to staff handling from start to finish. 66
In fact, there is some reason to doubt whether judges have much to
do with the publication decision in these areas. First, judges themselves do not usually do the initial screening that designates a case as a
likely candidate for disposition without argument. That initial decision is made by staff, usually staff attorneys or a circuit executive. A
high correlation obtains between cases not argued before the court and
cases disposed of without a published opinion. 67 Some of the screening procedures used by the circuits identify entire categories of cases
by subject matter as likely candidates for the expedited review that
results in nonpublication. 68 This suggests another reason why nonpublication may not be a good indication of the information value of
an opinion: Decisions that result in nonpublication have been made in
gross rather than individually, at least on the initial level, and judges
64. Robel, supra note 33, at Table 1. During the study period, the Ninth Circuit's publication rates in these areas were as follows: immigration 24%; s6cial security 31 % (disability review
only 26%); Federal Tort Claims Act 37%; criminal appeals 37%; state prisoner, habeas corpus
34%; civil rights 29%; employment discrimination against federal government 25%.
65. Judge Rubin notes, for instance, that not many highly qualified people would want to be
federal judges if the job involved a lot of social security and personal injury cases and nothing
more. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 648, 657 (1980).
66. Judge Posner argues that the "conventional argument against limited publication is
flawed" because it fails to recognize that "the preparation of unpublished opinions is delegated to
law clerks and staff attorneys . . . ." R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 124. Posner may not be
describing a practice uniform in all the circuits. Professor Hellman, who served as the supervising staff attorney at the Ninth Circuit, writes that staff drafting of opinions "remained the exception rather than the rule" during his tenure with the court. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate
Courts: The Experience ofthe Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 937, 982 (1980). See J. CECIL &
D. STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: A DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES IN
THE COURTS OF APPEALS 24-25 (1985) [hereinafter DECIDING CASES I] (describing staff attorney functions in providing draft opinions in nonargument cases).
67. J. CECIL & D.STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION
OF FOUR CoURTS OF APPEALS 31 (1987) [hereinafter DECIDING CASES II]. In the Fourth Circuit, for example, only 1% of cases not argued before the court are decided by published opinion.
The highest such percentage is 22%, in the Fifth Circuit. Id.
68. In the Fifth Circuit, for instance, staff attorneys responsible for the initial determination
whether to recommend argument routinely screen
prisoner cases with and without counsel, section 2255 cases with and without counsel, civil
federal question cases, civil cases in which the United States is a party (e.g., federal tort
claims act cases, bankruptcy cases, and [federal] agency cases other than tax cases), civil
rights cases other than title VII, and Social Security cases.
DECIDING CASES I, supra note 66, at 23.
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have few incentives to examine these initial decisions closely. 69 Existing data reveal that judges rarely disagree with the initial decision to
decide an appeal on the briefs alone. 70 This means that staff determinations about the relative merits of the cases almost always prevail,
and as noted above, staff determinations may be guided largely by the
subject matter of the opinion.
In effect, then, the determination not to publish occurs very early
in the appellate process, and necessarily so, for to delay the publication
decision until after an opinion is written would be to lose the time
savings the plans hope to achieve by having judges write with nonpublication in mind. Yet it seems unlikely that it will usually be possible
to predict the information value of an opinion before it is written. In
fact, many judges have noted how frequently a case's complexities are
revealed through the process of writing an opinion. 71 It seems likely,
therefore, that an opinion's ultimate information value would be hard
to predict at the time when the publication decisions are usually made.
All of the circuits have mechanisms by which membe~s of the
panel of judges that decides the case can force a decision's publication. 72 Available information suggests, though, that panel members
rarely do this in cases that have been initially identified for nonpublication by staff, perhaps because in many circuits these opinions are
drafted by central staff rather than the judges themselves or their own
clerks. 73 If the opinions are drafted by staff, judges will have little
investment in the final product. Even if a staff attorney, then, believes
that the decision warrants publication, that attorney will have to do
additional work to justify a publication decision, and the judges will
have to do additional work to gain confidence in the staff attorney's
product (or worse, draft an entirely new opinion themselves). In the
face of these extra efforts, institutional pressures operate to preserve
the initial decision identifying a case for nonpublication.
A two-tier system emerges. In some subject-matter areas, the
courts' screening processes and the assumptions of the publication
plans about the nature of precedent combine to assure that large num69. The benefits of screening cases for expedited review are lost if judges must reevaluate
every initial screening decision.
70. See DECIDING CASES II, supra note 67, at 55-56, 82-83, 103-04 (judges reject initial determinations by staff in only 10-20% of cases).
71. The statements to this effect by judges are legion. See, e.g., F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A
JUDGE 57-58 (1980). Thus, the decision not to publish an opinion because the appeal is not
complex might be self-fulfilling prophecy. See R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 124.
72. D. STIENSTRA, supra note 2, at 32.
73. See supra note 13.
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remain unpublished and

THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF DISINCENTIVE MECHANISMS

These aspects of the publication plans would be unimportant, perhaps, if people could be prevented entirely from using the unpublished
opinions; if, in practice, the opinions could be made truly disposable.
But my research on institutional litigants indicates that the methods
the courts employ to discourage use of unpublished opinions -:--- limited distribution and no-citation - do not work. In fact, these methods aggravate and enhance any inherent unfairness the selective
publication plans might have.
Because the plans underestimate the kinds of information attorneys derive from opinions and overestimate judges' abilities to implement the plans' central assumptions, those people who have unusual
access to unpublished opinions will gain an advantage over those who
do not. Moreover, the limited distribution plans currently operating
assure that the people with unusual access to these opinions will be the
same litigants who enjoy a variety of other institutional advantages in
litigation: the frequent litigants. 75 As parties to the cases, frequent
litigants receive the opinions. Additionally, because the opinions are
most often distributed only to parties and judges, the frequent litigants
will have unique access to a useful source of information known only
to them and the judges before whom they appear. The advantages of
this access are exaggerated because unpublished opinions tend to cluster in subject-matter areas that pit frequent litigants against those litigants Marc Galanter has dubbed "one-shotters." These areas include
criminal appeals, social security cases, and immigration cases, and in
these sorts of disputes it is unlikely that the same ability to monitor
unpublished opinions exists on both sides. 76
74. In the most recent year for which figures are available, the average percentage of unpublished opinions for all the federal appeals courts was 61 %. Two courts still publish a majority of
their opinions, the Seventh Circuit (34.2% unpublished) and the First Circuit (37.7% unpublished). The Fourth Circuit left an astonishing 80.2% of its opinions unpublished, with the runner-up for taciturnity being the Sixth Circuit, which left 77.6% unpublished. Figures are
available from Federal Judicial Center Integrated Data Base (includes information about all federal district and appellate court cases active during the period from Statistical Year (SY) 1970SY 1987). If the substance of the workload does not differ substantially among these courts, one
could surmise that more significant information might be available in unpublished form in a lowpublication rate circuit than in, say, the Seventh Circuit.
75. Marc Galanter has described many of these advantages in Galanter, Why the ''Haves"
Come out Ahead, 9 LAW & SocY. REv. 95 (1974).
76. This advantage will remain, I suspect, even with the advent of increased electronic reporting of these opinions through the commercial databases, since access to these databases is
still relatively expensive. It is possible that in some areas the "one-shotters" may be represented
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The no-citation rules also present only a minor disincentive against
using these opinions, especially for those litigants who have unusual
access to them. This is so in part because the "guts" of the opinion its reasoning, citations to authority, and such - can still be effectively
employed through incorporation in briefs and arguments, and because,
as explained above, attorneys gain useful information from these opinions other than the kinds contemplated by the no-citation rules. 77
To test my hypothesis that frequent litigants are not discouraged
from using unpublished opinions by the various mechanisms used by
the courts, I sent a questionnaire to representatives of that most ubiquitous of frequent litigants, the federal government. 78 I chose government attorneys for a number of reasons. First, the government
litigates in many subject areas disproportionately treated through unpublished opinions. 79 Second, government litigants occupy a unique
position under the distribution rules followed by the courts: because
they are always parties in cases involving the subject matter for which
they are responsible, they always receive copies of the unpublished
opinions issued in the cases. (The government is always a party to a
criminal appeal, for example, and the National Labor Relations Board
is always a party to an enforcement action.) This position enables govby a cohesive bar that could share these opinions or induce a publisher to publish them. There
has been very little research regarding information sharing by practitioners. Most of the infor·
mation I found about this topic centered on mass-tort litigation groups. See, e.g.. Ranii, How the
Plaintiffs' Bar Shares Its Information, Natl. L.J., July 23, 1984, at l; McHugh, Specialties Create
Need for Exotic Publications, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Mar. 21, 1983, at 1.
77. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
78. The text of the survey is as follows:
Questionnaire on Unpublished Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals
1. Are unpublished opinions circulated to attorneys within the office?
Are they circulated to regional offices?
Anyone else?
2. Are unpublished opinions filed?
If yes, are they filed with other material concerning the case in which they are issued?
Are they also filed separately?
Are they indexed?
3. Are unpublished opinions ever reviewed systematically within the office?
4. Are unpublished decisions ever consulted or used in any of the following ways?
a. in making litigation and settlement decisions
b. in writing briefs
c. in determining whether to appeal or contest an appeal
d. other
5. Has this office ever moved for publication of unpublished decisions pursuant to court
rules that allow for such motions?
If yes, who makes the determination to move for publication?
6. Comments
(Completed questionnaires are on file with author.).
79. During the period of this study, Robel, supra note 33, the Ninth Circuit published only
31 % of the opinions in which the Department of Health and Human Services was a party, 24%
of the opinions in which the Immigration and Naturalization Service was a party, and 39% of
the decisions in which the National Labor Relations Board was a party. In non-agency review
civil cases in which the U.S. was a party, the court published 26% of its opinions. Id. at Table 1.
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ernment litigants to compile and use substantial files that represent the
views of the courts of appeals in which they practice on their subjectmatter area. 80
The survey was designed. to determine two things: first, whether
government offices make these opinions accessible to the attorneys,
and second, whether the attorneys use them. The survey went to the
heads of six offices in Washington that are responsible for appellate
litigation in diverse subject-matter areas. Five of the offices were
within the Department of Justice: Immigration Litigation, Consumer
Litigation, Tax Division, Civil Rights Division, and the Appellate
Staff of the Civil Division. I also sent a survey to the National Labor
Relations Board. All of the offices responded. Of the six offices, only
the Office of Consumer Litigation, which handles relatively few appeals that result in unpublished opinions, responded that the opinions
were neither made accessible nor used in any way. 81
I first asked whether unpublished opinions are circulated to attorneys within the office and whether the opinions are filed. All but the
Civil Division Appellate staff responded that they do circulate copies
of unpublished opinions. Circulation of opinions increases the likelihood that attorneys will remember the opinions should they be involved in similar litigation. All of the offices responded that the
opinions are filed, most often with other materials related to the cases
in which they are issued. Three offices also filed them separately. 82
Finally, the Office of Immigration Litigation stated that it maintains
an index of unpublished opinions.
I asked the attorneys to tell me how they used unpublished opinions they received and suggested a number of ways in which the opinions might be used. All of the offices replied that they used
unpublished opinions in making litigation and settlement decisions
and in writing briefs. All but the NLRB also stated that they use the
opinions in making determinations about whether to appeal or contest
appeals in other cases. sJ
80. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
81. The Office of Consumer Litigation may be unique among the offices responding to the
survey in that it deals primarily with client offices like the Food and Drug Administration. It
also is involved in comparatively few appeals. In FY 1987, for example, the Office opened 21
cases on the appellate level. Telephone interview with Ken Maddox, Office of Consumer Litigation (Aug. 4, 1988).
82. Immigration Litigation, NLRB, and the Civil Rights Division file the opinions
separately.
83. The Attorney General (usually through the Office of the Solicitor General) is responsible
for all final determinations concerning appeals by the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1982).
However, the Solicitor General bas historically depended on recommendations of staff' in the
appellate sections of the Justice Department, and, in some instances, upon recommendations
from agencies, in making appeals determinations. This bas especially been the case in appeals to
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Finally, I asked whether the offices had ever moved for publication
of unpublished opinions. All the courts of appeals allow litigants to
move to change the status of opinions from unpublished to published.
Research by Galanter and others has suggested that frequent litigants
have more incentive to "play for rules" than do other litigants: That
is, they are more likely than other litigants to base litigation decisions
on the possibility of creating favorable precedent or avoiding unfavorable precedent, rather than simply obtaining a favorable outcome in
the immediate case. 84 It seemed plausible, therefore, that frequent litigants would also have more incentive than other litigants to seek publication of previously unpublished opinions when the opinions were
favorable to them. All of the offices surveyed stated that they had, in
fact, moved for publication of previously unpublished opinions.
Allowing motions for publication creates a serious flaw in the publication plans because, depending upon the frequency with which they
are granted, they allow frequent litigants to stack the precedential
deck. None of the courts of appeals keep any records on the frequency
of motions to publish or the parties involved, so it is difficult to know
much about this practice. 85 I was able to identify, though, all of the
Seventh Circuit opinions that have changed publication status in the
last five years. 86 What I discovered tends to confirm the suspicion that
frequent litigants take advantage of this mechanism more often than
others. In 1982, for example, thirty opinions changed status from unpublished to published. Twenty-two of them, or 73%, involved a government litigant, and fifteen of these were federal litigants. In all but
three of the cases involving the government, the result of the opinion
favored the government, and among cases involving federal litigants,
the result was always favorable.
Because the United States Attorneys are responsible for so much
appellate litigation, I attempted to check my initial findings through
surveys directed at all of the United States Attorney offices, both main
the courts of appeals. See Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statisti·
cal Study, 11 Haus. L. REv. 1101 (1974).
84. Galanter, supra note 75, at 100. See also Carrington, supra note 83, at 1102 (United
States is a "cautious and successful" litigant that approaches appeals decisions from perspective
of rule development).
85. Correspondence with court clerks (on file with author).
86. Seventh Circuit opinions that are first released as unpublished opinions and are then
published carry the following legend: "This case was previously decided by unpublished order
according to Circuit Rule 35." Although these opinions can be identified, it is not always possible to tell whether the court itselflater published the opinion or whether one of the parties moved
for publication. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits also indicate when an opinion has changed
status, and in the District of Columbia Circuit, the authoring judge has the option of indicating a
change in status. None of the other circuits routinely indicate when changes occur. Correspondence with court clerks (on file with author).
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offices and branch offices, asking these attorneys the same questions
that I asked those in the Washington offices. Unfortunately, I received
only a twenty percent response. 87
While I hesitate to draw any conclusions because of this low response rate, those attorneys responding generally confirmed the earlier
findings from the Washington offices. Ninety percent of those responding used unpublished opinions in writing briefs, and 70% said
they used the opinions in making litigation or settlement decisions and
in determining whether to appeal or oppose an appeal. Only 60% of
the offices stated that they had moved for publication of previously
unpublished opinions, but several of the responses were from branch
offices, and some respondents believed that these motions had been
made by the main office in their district.
ls LIMITED PUBLICATION NECESSARY?

I conclude from these surveys that the publication plans are seriously flawed. The mechanisms that supposedly ensure the disposability of unpublished opinions do not work and in fact increase the
likelihood that the plans are substantively unfair. Motions for publication, selective distribution of unpublished opinions, and rules against
citation do little more than create possibilities for frequent litigants tQ
manipulate .precedent through manipulating publication, while they
provide insignificant disincentives for these litigants to use the
opinions.
Despite the problems with the limited publication plans, Judge
Posner has argued that they are a necessary evil. While he accepts in
theory many of the points argued here, 88 he argues that unpublished
opinions are not prepared with the same care as those that are published and that this fact significantly decreases their information value.
If the quality of the opinions cannot be increased, 89 he argues, then the
opinions ought not to be used because "their information value would
be slight - maybe even negative."90
87. The Executive Office of the United States Attorneys requires all surveys of U.S. Attorneys to receive approval from the Executive Office before attorneys respond. When I became
aware of the rule, I asked that the Executive Office allow the attorneys to reply to my survey, but
I was told that the office had determined that responses would not be in the best interest of the
Justice Department. I was also forwarded a copy of an order from the Executive Office to all
U.S. Attorneys that requested that they not cooperate with me. Letter from Jason Green, Executive Office of United States Attorneys (Mar. 20, 1987) (on file with author).
88. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 123 ("almost by definition, all opinions have some actual or
precedential value").
89. And, he argues, given caseload pressures, it cimnot be. Id. at 124.
90. Id.

960

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:940

In what sense could this be true? The information value of these
opinions might be "negative" if the results in the opinions were whimsical; if, for instance, they had no predictive value whatsoever. Or the
opinions' value might be negative if it were generally true that those
decisions reached in unpublished opinions were in some sense wrong.
I don't expect that Judge Posner meant either of these things. Rather,
I believe that his essential objection is that these opinions are not
judge-work but staff-work, and that they might not accurately reflect
what judges would do in a perfect world with unlimited time - or
even with a published opinion. But I think this objection misses a
central point of Posner's own book: that judges haven't more time,
and so the system we have - at least as it concerns judges - is what
we are likely to have in the future. The relevant question, then, is not
whether judges ought to be expected to increase their involvement in
producing unpublished opinions, but whether practitioners ought to be
denied access to the work product of those people who do produce the
opinions - the staff. It is very little answer to a practitioner who
works in one of the subject-matter areas in which unpublished opinions predominate that he should not have that access because these
opinions are ghost-written. In reality, this practitioner needs precisely
to know the contents of unpublished opinions prepared by central staff
and law clerks.
The nature of central staff and law clerk work argues against Posner's earlier conclusion that the information value of these opinions is
slight. If, as he argues elsewhere in his book, 91 clerks and staff attorneys are by nature cautious, and if they deal with appeals involving the
same subject-matter areas repeatedly, it is likely that they will take
advantage of their earlier work (or even the work of their predecessors) by filing it and referring to it. Further, if Posner is correct that
staff attorneys are less constrained by the values of the judges than law
clerks are (since they do not often work with one judge for long), 92
then it seems even more plausible that the notion of a second tier with its own set of "precedents" and culture of decision - exists in
those areas that are routinely relegated to staff handling. If the numbers of appeals that are routed through this second tier were trivial,
perhaps the loss to the courts in credibility or authoritativeness that
would come from publicly accepting the current state of affairs would
outweigh the fact that some practitioners are able to exploit the present system. But the numbers are not trivial. 93
91. Id. at 108-13.

92. Id. at 113.
93. See supra note 74.
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The biggest objection most judges have to changing the present
system is that any change will increase the demands on judges. Judges
generally agree that they cannot be expected to increase their output
significantly, nor can they be expected to take on the task of authoring
decisions in the large number of unpublished cases. While the lack of
judge involvement in unpublished opinions poses a serious critique of
the publication plans generally, 94 this critique does not attack the inequalities in access to the opinions and the information· they contain,
which is an objection of a different order. There is no reason why
judges would have to change their behavior to accommodate universal
publication. Those opinions that now remain unpublished could instead be published with a legend indicating that they are not to be
cited except in those limited instances95 that unpublished opinions can
now be cited. By continuing tO limit citation, judges would be encouraged not to change their present behavior, since they. would not
have to take account of these opinions in any more instances than they
now do. We could then allow attorneys to make whatever use of the
opinions is rational, and I suspect that attorneys can be trusted to behave rationally iµ this regard. 96
Finally, universal publication would have other advantages. My
survey of government attorneys and my analysis of existing data about
government involvement in unpublished opinions raise a number of
other issues. Significant government involvement in a body of cases
that is relatively inaccessible and unexaprined is inherently troubling.
In many of the subject-matter areas routinely consigned to nonpublication, the standard of review employed by the court is already extremely deferential. 97 For example, in social security or immigration
94. This lack of involvement raises a host of issues about the credibility of the courts. For a
poetic example of some aspects of the debate, see J. VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE
AUTHORITARIAN (1986).
95. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
96. Since there is no rule that prohibits anyone from publishing these opinions now, one
might ask whether the publishing companies have already made a determination that no one
wants access to these opinions. In fact, the contrary is true. Unpublished opinions are often
"reported" on the LEXIS and WESTLAW computer databases and in some specialty reporters,
such as BNA's Labor Relations Reference Manual However, the decisions about which opinions
to report and where to report them are made on an ad hoc basis by various companies, with the
result that significant amounts of information remain unavailable. Because of the special relationship between the federal courts and West Publishing Company (the official reporter for the
federal courts), I believe West would offer the unpublished cases were the courts to tender them
for publication.
Of course, one of the goals of limited publication plans was to reduce the bar's cost of research by excluding sterile decisions from the research pool. If the operation of the plans cannot
be trusted to have this result, as I argue, then decisions about how heavily to research this new
source of information should be left to attorneys.
97. Cf. Davies, supra note 45, at 591-619 (discussing role of standard° of review in affirmance
rates).
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cases, the relevant agency usually needs only to meet standards asking
whether the agency's determination is supported and is not arbitrary
or capricious. What is the consequence of consigning large numbers
of these cases to routine handling by staff for ultimate disposition
through unpublished opinion? One possible consequence might be the
inability of the traditional critics - the bar and the scholarly community - as well as the bench to discern trends in agency decisionmak.ing. Not only do trends in the executive's administration of a statute
become more difficult to determine, but difficulties in the administration of a statute or in the statutes themselves become more difficult to
detect. In essence, the practice of selective publication obstructs effective oversight of government litigation and decisionmaking by both
interested and disinterested observers. A system of universal publication with limited citation would eliminate this obstruction.
CONCLUSION

The courts adopted selective publication plans over a decade ago
with the idea of alleviating severe pressures on judges' time. Little
thought has been given since to the question of how litigants have
adapted their practices to accommodate the plans. 98 Yet answers to
what litigants actually do with the opinions are central to evaluating
whether selective publication is an equitable way to decrease the workload of the courts.
As my survey shows, some litigants can and do use these opinions
in ways that call into question the fairness of the current publication
policies. This problem need not be accepted as an inevitable byproduct of rising caseloads. It can, and should, be remedied.

98. Nor has much thought been given to how judges actually use the plans. For instance, it
has been known for some time that publication plans containing presumptions for publication do
not produce high publication rates nor do plans that contain presumptions against publication
necessarily produce low publication rates. Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication in the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807, 815. More systematic study of the actual factors
that affect publication is needed.

